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The world we perceive is delayed in relation to its flowing content, as well as the outcome of
our actions on the world in relation to the moment we decide to act. This mosaic of different
latencies permeating both perception and action has to be taken into account critically in order
for us to cope with the temporal challenges constantly imposed by the environment. Fundamental
notions, such as the sense of agency and causality, depend on the temporal relationship of events
occurring in well-defined windows of time. Here, we offer a broad, yet abridged, historical view
of some thought-provoking issues concerning the time of perception and action. From the pioneering
work of Wundt, Titchener, and Libet to recent findings and ideas related to the employment of
visual illusions as psychophysical probes (such as the flash-lag effect), we have tried to expose
some problems inherent to the act of measuring the time of both perception and action, and devise
possible solutions as well.
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El mundo que percibimos está retardado en relación a su flujo de contenido, al igual que el
resultado de nuestras acciones sobre el mundo en relación con el momento en que decidamos
actuar. Este mosaico de diferentes latencias que penetra tanto en la percepción como en la
acción debe ser tenido en cuenta de forma crítica para poder manejar los retos temporales
constantemente impuestos por el entorno. Nociones fundamentales, como el sentido de ser un
agente y el de la causalidad, dependen de la relación temporal  de los eventos que ocurren en
ventanas bien definidas de tiempo. Aquí ofrecemos un panorama histórico extenso pero abreviado
de algunas cuestiones provocadoras de la reflexión acerca del tiempo de la percepción y de la
acción. Desde los trabajos pioneros de Wundt, Titchener y Libet hasta los descubrimientos
recientes y las ideas relacionadas con el empleo de las ilusiones ópticas tales como el efecto
“flash-lag”, como sondas psicofísicas, hemos intentado exponer algunos de los problemas
inherentes al acto de medir el tiempo, tanto el de la percepción como el de la acción, así como
diseñar soluciones posibles. 
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When we look at a starry sky, we see a world that never
existed in that way: many stars we still see died long ago,
before others were born. The time elapsed since a photon
leaves a star until it reaches our retinas varies from a few
to billions of years. Surprisingly, although on a different
scale, the same holds true for our daily life: the face we
see, the voice we hear, and the hand we touch at the same
time, engender sensory signals that take different times to
travel throughout our neural processing stages, from receptors
to the brain, before a bound and unitary percept is created.
Moreover, transmission delays are by no means a feature
inherent to perceptual processing only but are an integral
component of motor behaviors as well. 
On the one hand, behavioral timing is a crucial issue
in survival, as adaptive success may depend on reasonably
accurate judgments of temporal order and durations, as
well as on precisely timed motor commands. On the other
hand, differential transmission and processing latencies
create a mosaic of temporal patterns spreading through the
pathways and networks underlying both perception and
action. A fundamental question thus immediately arises:
How can we deal with such unrelated latencies in order
to cope with the temporal challenges constantly imposed
by the environment? We could split the above question
into two. The first half addresses the generation of prompt
skilled actions, which might involve predictive and
automatic mechanisms, usually quite independent of
conscious scrutiny but strongly dependent on previous
learning experience. The second half of the question tackles
the recognition that perception not only lags behind sensory
reality but does it by spreading itself over a blend of
temporal delays. For example, in a large concert hall, not
only is all we perceive delayed in relation to the stimulating
sources but also the asynchrony between what we see and
what we hear might reach up to 400 ms (Durgin &
Sternberg, 2002; Pöppel, 1997). 
The psychology—and metaphysics—of time perception
has a long and enthralling history. In the eighteenth century,
astronomers experienced better than anyone else the
difficulties in measuring the very instant of time when an
event takes place. Using the so-called “eye and ear” method,
they recorded the precise positions of celestial events. This
method consisted of measuring the moment when a particular
star crossed the meridian marker of a telescope, with the
time instant of stellar crossing being estimated by counting
the audible ticking of a pendulum clock. Spatial interpolation
was then used to estimate the moment of transit in tenths
of seconds. 
Large discrepancies between trained astronomers often
resulted in significant measurement errors and this variability
led to the formulation of a “personal equation” to try to
correct this problem (Boring, 1929). The link between
astronomy and psychology was made by the father of
experimental psychology (or physiological psychology, as
he named it), Wilhelm Wundt (Schmidgen, 2003, 2005).
Using a pendulum apparatus (Figure 1), he designed an
experimental setup inspired by the eye and ear method. In
a series of experiments, subjects had to judge the position
of a fast moving clock hand when a brief click was
presented. Wundt showed that participants systematically
misperceived the position of the hand, perceiving it ahead
or before the true position (the position where the hand
physically was when the click was presented), depending
on the experimental conditions. This was the prime example
of a “complication experiment,” characterized by involving
the perceptual comparison of a continuous and a sudden
event. Wundt’s results could be accounted for by invoking
either differences between visual and auditory perceptual
latencies or different strategies adopted by the observers;
more precisely, to which of the two events, visual or
auditory, the observer was paying attention during the task.
Among others, these findings led Titchener (1908) to
formulate the law of prior entry: “the object of attention
comes to consciousness more quickly than the objects which
we are not attending.” 
As we shall see, these two kinds of accounts—differential
latencies and attention—are nowadays still offered as
explanations of the outcomes of related psychophysical tasks
used to assess the spatiotemporal features of sensory
perception, such as the flash-lag effect (FLE) and temporal
order judgments (TOJ). In psychophysical tasks involving
either the FLE or TOJ, we can often observe large shifts in
the psychometric functions, in comparison to the
accompanying thresholds, which characterize them as true
illusions (Klein, 2002). Whereas an illusion arising from a
TOJ is purely temporal, the FLE represents, as we will see
next, a perceptual illusion in space and time. 
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Figure 1. Wundt´s pendulum apparatus used in “complication
experiments” (from www.psichi.org/pubs/articles/article_457.asp)
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Illusions in Space-Time
The Flash-Lag Effect
As mentioned above, recurring disagreement between
the measurements made by different astronomers at that
time, led to the proposal that perceptual discrepancies might
arise from the relative sharing of attention split between
visual and auditory stimuli (Spence, Shore, & Klein, 2001).
In a more contemporary and prosaic scenario, assistant
referees often make mistakes during soccer games when
judging the relative location of an attacking player at the
moment the ball touches or is passed by one of his or her
teammates (Baldo, Ranvaud, & Morya, 2002).
The common root of the above examples (and of any
complication experiment in general) is the need to perform a
dual task: where is the moving object (star or player) when
the time-marker was presented (a given tick or pass). This
question is intrinsically spatial and temporal in its very essence.
In the midst of a variety of other visual illusions arising from
the same question, the flash-lag effect (FLE) stands out as a
still intriguing perceptual phenomenon, hotly debated over the
last 12 years (Baldo & Klein, 1995; Eagleman, 2001; Eagleman
& Sejnowski, 2000; Krekelberg & Lappe, 2001; Lappe &
Krekelberg, 1998; Nijhawan, 1994, 2002; Nijhawan &
Khurana, 2000; Purushothaman, Patel, Bedell, & Ogmen,
1998; Schlag & Schlag-Rey, 2002; Whitney, 2002). In the
FLE, a stationary flash is perceived as spatially lagging behind
a moving object, despite their being physically aligned to each
other at that moment (Figure 2).
The FLE, in fact an almost 100-year-old illusion
(Fröhlich, 1923; Mackay, 1958; Metzger, 1931), was
rediscovered in new clothing by Romi Nijhawan (Nijhawan,
1992, 1994). Nijhawan originally interpreted the flash-lag
effect as resulting from a spatial extrapolation of the moving
object (“motion extrapolation”), owing to the predictability
of its trajectory. The perceptually extrapolated position of
a moving object would thus compensate for the spatial error
introduced by delays occurring throughout the visual system. 
In 1995, the first challenge to Nijhawan’s explanation
was put forward by Baldo and Klein. It was then
demonstrated that the magnitude of the FLE was dependent
not only on the features of the moving object (such as its
speed), as previously shown by Nijhawan, but on the visual
eccentricity of the stationary flash as well. This finding was
at odds with the underpinnings of the motion extrapolation
hypothesis. At that time, we interpreted the FLE “as resulting
from a longer time delay involved in the visual processing
of the flashing dots” (Baldo & Klein, 1995). We proposed
that some amount of time, dependent on eccentricity, is
required to bring the flashing stimulus to a sufficiently high
degree of perceptual processing for a snapshot of the moving
stimulus to be taken. Three years later, three independent
groups reported empirical findings that, yet again, did not
fit in he motion extrapolation scheme. These authors showed,
for instance, the robust dependence of the FLE on the
trajectory of the moving stimulus (Lappe & Krekelberg,
1998; Whitney & Murakami, 1998) as well as on the
luminance of both moving and stationary stimuli (Lappe &
Krekelberg; Purushothaman et al., 1998). From then on, the
way was paved for a multitude of different approaches,
views, and accounts concerning the flash-lag phenomenon
(for reviews, see Eagleman, 2001; Krekelberg & Lappe,
2001; Nijhawan, 2002; Nijhawan & Khurana, 2000; Schlag
& Schlag-Rey, 2002; Whitney, 2002).
Our first demonstration of a putative role of visual
attention in forging the flash-lag effect was based on a rather
hazy empirical foundation (Baldo & Klein, 1995). The main
idea was centered on the time delay required to shift attention
from the flashing stimulus’ location to the moving stimulus’
pathway, in order to make a spatial judgment of their relative
locations. The influence of visual eccentricity on attentional
shifts was, however, confounded with its even stronger
influence on basic sensory issues, such as temporal latencies
and spatial resolution. Later on, we were able to refine our
analysis, providing more convincing support to the contribution
of visual attention to the FLE. The magnitude of the FLE
was shown to be modulated by the spatial predictability of
the flashing stimulus (Baldo, Kihara, & Klein, 2000; Baldo,
Kihara, Namba, & Klein, 2002; Baldo & Namba, 2002) and
its symbolic cueing as well (Namba & Baldo, 2004).
Moreover, a modulatory role of either bottom-up or top-down
deployment of attention was recently implemented in a simple
feed-forward neural network (Baldo & Caticha, 2005), which
was able not only to replicate a long list of empirical findings
but also to encapsulate, in a unifying perspective, the main
current accounts concerning the FLE. 
Temporal Order Judgment
If we cannot determine the absolute timing of a
subjective experience, all that can be done is to compare
the relative timing of different experiences. This comparison
is carried out in perceptual tasks involving temporal order
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the flash-lag effect. (A) The
flashing stimulus is presented physically aligned to the moving
one. (B) The subjects’ perception of their relative locations, in
which the flash is seen as lagging the moving stimulus.
judgments (TOJ), in which a pair of near-simultaneous
stimuli are presented and observers are asked to judge which
of them came first (Allan, 1975; James, 1890; Jaskowski,
1991; Spence et al., 2001; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973; Ulrich,
1987). The idea behind TOJ manipulation is that one
stimulus of the pair could receive some kind of perceptual
priority that would alter the time it takes to reach awareness.
The factors that establish this perceptual priority could be
grouped into pre-attentive and attentive processes (Haddad,
Carreiro, & Baldo, 2002). Pre-attentive, or sensory, factors
comprise some basic features of the sensory stimulus, such
as its physical intensity or visual eccentricity (Haddad, Klein,
& Baldo, 1999). 
Attention is also assumed to influence the speed with
which a stimulus will reach consciousness (Stelmach &
Herdman, 1991), in line with the idea that the sensory
information originating from an attended stimulus reaches
some critical point in neural processing prior to the
information arising from an unattended stimulus (Jaskowski,
1993; Stelmach & Herdman). Recently, the role of attention
in temporal order perception has been investigated by means
of the simultaneous measures of TOJ and event-related
potential (ERP) recordings in the human visual cortex
(McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, Russo, & Hillyard, 2005). These
investigators observed that attention enhanced the amplitude
of neural activity in the visual cortex, showing that attention-
induced shifts in time-order perception probably arise from
modulations of signal strength rather than from processing
speed in the early sensory pathways. 
The Time of Perception
The archetype of striking results obtained by employing
TOJ and complication experiments (such as those leading
to the FLE) is found in the seminal work carried out by
Benjamin Libet and collaborators (Libet, 2002, 2004; Libet,
Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1979). Working with patients
undergoing neurosurgical procedures, Libet and his group
assessed latencies involved in both perception and action
(see also the next section, The Time of Action). Their
findings have been pungently debated since then, which has
contributed to a clarification of concepts and interpretations
related to the phenomenology of time in perception as well
in action. 
In a series of experiments, Libet and his group (Libet,
Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1979) compared the time of
sensations arising from the electrical stimulation of the
subject’s hand with the time of sensations caused by the
direct electrical stimulation of the exposed somatossensory
cortex (Figure 3). The delay involved in eliciting a sensation
by means of a peripheral and natural stimulus includes the
signal transmission through sensory pathways and the
completion of a sequence of neural events in higher areas
of the nervous system (which Libet called “neural
adequacy”). Given that this latency, measured in previous
experiments, is of hundreds of milliseconds, Libet and his
colleagues expected the patients to report, for the stimuli
presented simultaneously, that the cortical stimulation could
be felt first. In fact, the inverse was observed, even in
instances in which the cortex was stimulated before the
hand. Libet and colleagues interpreted their results by
proposing that the sensations evoked by the skin stimulation
were referred “backward” to the time of the stimulus (Libet,
2002, 2004; Libet et al.; see also, on this topic, the special
issue of Conscious and Cognition, Volume 11, 2002).
Libet’s findings and interpretations instilled some furor
in the scientific arena, and were taken at face value by some
scientists either to substantiate exotic physical proposals
(Penrose, 1989) or to lend support to a dualist view of the
neurosciences (Popper & Eccles, 1983). On the other hand,
Libet´s work has been also severely criticized on both
methodological and interpretational grounds (Churchland,
1981, 1986; Glynn, 1990; Gomes, 1998, 2002; Klein, 2002;
Pocket 2002). A special kind of criticism, akin to the present
discussion, concerns the representation of time by our brains
(Dennett, 1991; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Glynn).
As sustained by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (Dennett,
1991; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992) and by the physiologist
Ian Glynn (1990), the brain does not have to use time to
represent time itself. Therefore, it would be improper to
identify the perception of an event’s occurrence time with
the time when we become conscious of it. That is, it is not
necessary to postulate an isomorphism between the temporal
order of the brain processes and the represented temporal
order of events in the world. Instead of this, the nervous
system would simply add time markers (or “stamps”) on
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Figure 3. Schematic representation of Libet’s experimental
procedure. The sensory stimulus applied to the left hand elicits a
neural activation in the contralateral (right) somatossensory cortex.
By its turn, the direct stimulation of the left somatossensory cortex
is reported to be felt in the contralateral (left) hand (modified from
Dennett, 1991).
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sensory inputs early in the series of neural events related to
the conscious perception of these inputs. When asked to
judge the time of occurrence of a given stimulus, subjects
could use these markers to order a sequence of mental
events. This approach remits to Dennett’s “content-vehicle”
distinction. As an example, we can consider what happens
when we receive a letter from the post office. If we are
interested in the time at which the events (content) in the
letter (vehicle) occurred, we look at the date on the letter
(time of content) rather than consider the date at which it
was delivered (time of vehicle). This line of reasoning is
quite similar to the “postdiction” account, devised by
Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000) in order to explain the
flash-lag effect. According to these views, perception is not
an “on-line” process, but “postdicted” to the instant of
relevant time-markers. 
The Time of Action
In 1983, based on his earlier research, Libet and
collaborators started a sequence of classical experiments
that aimed to measure the occurrence time of a voluntary
motor decision (Libet, 1985, 2004; Libet, Gleason, Wright,
& Pearl 1983). They did this by asking the subject to report
the perceived location of a clock’s hand at the moment the
urge to move was felt and also when the movement was
felt to be executed. Their main findings were that a specific
electrical signal observed in brain activity, called readiness
potential (RP), occurred about 500 ms before the voluntary
act, whereas the subjective feeling of the urge to act was
reported roughly 150 ms before the voluntary act. According
to Libet, these results indicate that the brain starts the
voluntary process before the subject becomes consciously
aware of the urge or wish, and the RP would be correlated
with the conscious intention. Haggard and Eimer (1999),
using a modification of Libet’s paradigm found that the
lateralized readiness potential (LRP) is more likely to be
the correlate of conscious intention, rather than the RP. The
LRP is the point at which activity in the hemisphere
contralateral to the selected hand exceeds the ipsilateral
activity associated with the non-selected hand. These results
would indicate that conscious intention is linked to the
specific preparation to perform a particular movement and
not to the earliest neural preparation to action. Though the
results found by Libet have had a long and often
controversial history, an important contribution of these
results is the suggestion that before we became aware of
our intentions, several processes have already taken place
in our brain.
More recent psychophysical studies, employing a
procedure similar to Libet’s, have demonstrated that being
agent of an event might affect the perceived time of such
event (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In their
experiments, Haggard and colleagues asked subjects to
indicate the perceived time of either their actions or a beep
evoked by their action after a 250 ms delay. These results
were compared with blocks in which the subjects judged
either an action that did not evoke a beep, or a beep that
occurred without action. They found that subjects perceived
their action as shifted in time towards the beep that it caused,
and perceived the beep as shifted earlier in time towards
the action that caused it (Figure 4). In further experiments
they added a delay between the key press and the evoked
beeps. The results showed that this binding decreases as the
interval between action and effect increases. Additionally,
this binding effect is modulated by temporal contiguity and
temporal predictability and these authors refer to this linkage
as intentional binding (for a review, see Haggard, 2005). 
An issue that arises is what mechanisms might be involved
in intentional binding. A possible explanation would be based
on feed-forward models. In 1950, Roger Sperry proposed that
when a motor command is sent to the muscles, an efferent
copy (also known as “corollary discharge”) is also sent to the
sensory areas of the brain. This efferent copy would reduce
the latency of the stimulus caused by the subject. Apparently,
even organisms as simple as arthropods have such a
mechanism (Webb, 2004). More recently, several feed-forward
models based on efferent copies have been proposed in order
to explain certain aspects of motor performance, such as motor
planning, prediction, and learning (Wolpert, 1997). The main
assumption of these models is that the preparation of a
movement would include an efferent copy sent to an internal
predictive model (Figure 5). This model estimates the effect
of the motor commands, allowing more rapid adjustments
and more fluent movement. Although these models were
originally proposed to explain motor performance, they
became valuable to understand which components of action
are conscious, and which are unconscious.
Other possibilities for intentional binding might be
suggested. As we discussed previously, attention is known
to have an important influence on the perception of an
event’s occurrence time, shifting the perception of an
Figure 4. Intentional binding between voluntary actions and their
effects. When action and tone occur together, the perceived time
of the action shifts forwards in time from the baseline value,
towards the tone. The perceived time of the tone shifts earlier in
time, towards the action. Action and tone are bound together across
time, implying a reduction in the perceived interval between them
(modified from Haggard, 2005).
attended event to an earlier instant in time. When one
causes a stimulus, its temporal predictability can be
considered as the highest possible (Eagleman &
Holcombe, 2002), which might reduce its perceptual
latency. This attentional hypothesis differs from Haggard’s
proposal. According to him, the binding of action and its
effect is a result of specific cognitive functions of our
central nervous system, rather than a consequence of
attentional processes. As for the attentional account, the
preparation of a movement would include the allocation
of attentional resources to both the expected sensory
consequences and the time of execution of the movement
itself. Again, we enter the question as to whether our
nervous system utilizes time to encode time: Does the
stimulus caused by the subject reach some neuronal
population faster than a computer-generated stimulus
because of some neural facilitation, or does our brain
represent a self-produced stimulus in such a way that is
later interpreted as occurring before in time? Although
these processes might occur later in our perception, the
facilitation may be due to processes that begin with the
specific preparation of an action. Here too, we can see
that the flash-lag effect can also be used as a useful tool
to investigate the relationship between perception and
action. As recently shown by Joan López-Moliner and
Daniel Linares (2005, 2006), and also by us (Haddad &
Baldo, 2005), when the time-marker (flash) is triggered
by an active observer, the magnitude of the flash-effect,
given by the relative location between the flash and a
moving stimulus, is reduced when compared to a passive
condition, in which the flash is not actively triggered.
These results make clear the influence of action on space-
time perception, although still not uncoupling attentional
modulation from other cognitive mechanisms.
Conclusion
Besides acting on the world we live in, we struggle to
make sense of it. Actually, to perceive the world is to build
mental models (representations) that should be useful in
planning future actions. Therefore, we could say that our
actions (as well as our ancestors’ actions) shape our
perceptions. Similarly to the paramount role of timing in
planning and executing adaptive actions, timing is also
crucial to mold the final content of our perceptions. For
instance, the natural and crystal-clear sense of causality
depends on narrow temporal correlations between perceived
events. Another vital notion, our sense of agency also
depends on temporal correlations between what we perceive
from the world and what we perceive from our own actions.
Therefore, the physical timing of events is translated to the
neural timing of neuronal processes, which is then somehow
represented as a particular mental timing of experiential
percepts (van de Grind, 2002).
In this paper, we have tried to show some problems
inherent to the act of measuring the time of perception and
action. Except for TOJ procedures, in which the comparisons
are made between two abrupt events, in most cases, the
comparison takes place between an abrupt event and a
moving one (even when motion does not happen in the usual
physical space, but within a more abstract perceptual space).
It happened in Wundt’s, Libet’s and Haggard’s experiments,
as described above, as well as in all procedures leading to
the flash-lag phenomenon: the instant of occurrence of a
sudden stimulus (the occurrence instant that one wants to
measure) must be matched with the course of some temporal
variable in continuous flow. It happens all the time in daily
situations: for instance, as when someone asks us what time
is it now. To provide this information, we have to look at
the clock (which takes time) and then the very instant we
intended to grasp has already passed. In the same way, in
the experiments discussed here, our nervous system had to
deal with the task of comparing the neural activity related
to an abrupt event with the ongoing neural activity related
to an event “moving” in sensory space. At least, this process
should require an attentional shift from the abrupt-neural-
activity to the moving-neural-activity and would, therefore,
spend some amount of time. Hence, we are faced to a
general problem concerning every attempt to measure the
particular instant of occurrence of a perceptual event. This
is a tremendous challenge because, as we saw, fundamental
difficulties arise whenever subjects have to perceptually
crystallize an instant of time.
As a last remark, we should not overlook the very
essence of time, with its physical and metaphysical
meanings. These aspects are to be included in any serious
debate on the relationship between time and perception;
otherwise we could come up, for example, with the following
original conclusion: “there are three times, […] for these
three exist in the mind, and I find them nowhere else: the
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Figure 5. Schematic representation of a forward model. The forward
model assumes the operation of an internal loop (broken lines) that
leads the motor command to generate the anticipation of sensory
changes, which can be then used to modulate the processing of
the ongoing input (adapted from Webb, 2004). 
Motor command Motor output
Sensory inputSensory processing
Forward model
Prediction
Effect on world
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present of things past is memory, the present of things present
is sight, the present of things future is expectation.” Although
these words may sound quite contemporary and, as a matter
of fact, they may express current views on time perception,
they were stated by St. Augustine about 1600 years ago.
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